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DISCHARGE OF NONCIVIL SERVICE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR POLITICAL
ACTIVITY: THE SEARCH FOR A MORE
EQUITABLE TEST
A large percentage of the 15.7 million government workers' in the
United States are noncivil service public employees.2 Thus, they lack
statutory3 protection of their first amendment4 rights of political affilia-
1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Dep't of Labor Employment and Earnings 45
table B-1 (Feb. 1984). Of this number, 2,760,000 people worked for the federal govern-
ment, and state and local governments employed 12,947,000. Id
2. A noncivil service employee is not hired through an established civil service pro-
gram at the federal or state level. This Note focuses on state and local noncivil service
public employees, including teachers, deputy sheriffs, public defenders, road workers,
and nonelected public officials. See infra note 3 (description of the Hatch Act). Exami-
nation of the statutory regulation of public employees is beyond the scope of this Note.
3. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1982), proscribes federal civil service employ-
ees' political activities. The Hatch Act prohibits covered employees from actively par-
ticipating in political management or political campaigns, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982).
The Act also bars employees from using official authority or influence to interfere with
or affect the results of an election. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1) (1982). For a brief discussion
of the Hatch Act, see Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1611, 1651-60 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
The Hatch Act survived a first amendment challenge in United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). See also Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding a state version of the Hatch Act); Wachs-
man v. City of Dallas, 704 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983) (up-
holding restrictions on municipal employees).
4. The first amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom ofspeech.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment was
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1931). See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (general discussion on freedom of expression and
the first amendment).
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tion,5 political speech,6 and political participation.7 As an employer,
the state often limits the political activities' of public employees9 to
operate without unnecessary disruption10 and to be more responsive to
the electorate. 1 Public employees who engage in political activity may
hinder the state's ability to fulfil these objectives. A serious disruption
may result in dismissal. 2 However, discharging 3 a public employee
for political activity raises serious constitutional questions.
14
5. Political affiliation is the act of belonging to or identifying with a political party
or candidate. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976).
6. Political speech is speech about public issues, including criticism of the means or
methods by which the state carries out its duties and policies. See, e.g., Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
7. Political participation is activity in a political campaign or election. See, e.g.,
McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
8. For the purposes of this Note, the term "political activities" encompasses affilia-
tion, speech, and participation. These areas are treated as separate and distinct
categories.
9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568-73 (1968) (disciplinary
action may be necessary to preserve the efficiency of the services performed by the
agency); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (government's interest lies in the
effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public).
11. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976) (plurality opinion) (the state may
discharge employees to prevent obstruction of policies presumably sanctioned by the
electorate).
12. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text; Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822,
833 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (uninhibited speech by government employees often has an ineffi-
cient, disharmonic, or chaotic effect upon a government office).
13. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "discharge" or "dismissal" refer to any
adverse employment action, including refusal to hire, failure to promote, and termina-
tion of employment. See, eg., MacFarlane v. Grasso, 696 F.2d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1982)
(refusal to hire); Walters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 836, 837 n.9 (11 th Cir. 1982) (demo-
tion and transfer); Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusal
to promote); Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (letters of
reprimand); Note, First Amendment Limitations on Patronage Employment Practices, 49
U. CHI. L. REv. 181 (1982) (arguing that "all adverse personnel actions taken because
of an employee's political affiliation are unconstitutional"). But see Delong v. United
States, 621 F.2d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that adverse employment action must
be "tantamount to outright dismissal" before employee has cause of action).
14. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). The Perry court held that an
individual has no right to a valuable public benefit such as government employment.
Although the government may deny the benefit for virtually any reason, it cannot in-
fringe on the individual's constitutionally protected interests. See generally L. TRinE,
AMERICAN CONSrrIrIONAL LAW, 1978 §§ 12-5, 12-23; Note, Public Employees and
the First Amendment: Connick v. Myers, 15 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 293 (1984); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Civil Rights--A Question of Free Speech for Public Employees, 30
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The Supreme Court follows two approaches to determine if the dis-
missal of a public employee for engaging in political activity violates
the first amendment.' 5 If a public employee's discharge is based on
political affiliation, the Court applies a categorical test to distinguish
between protected and unprotected activities. 16 For a dismissal due to
the exercise of political speech, the Court applies an ad hoc balancing
test to weigh and evaluate the competing interests involved. 7 So far,
the Supreme Court has not articulated a standard to apply to cases
involving discharge for political participation. Since participation has
attributes of both political affiliation and political speech,' 8 lower
courts disagree regarding which test should apply to political participa-
tion discharge cases.' 9
In general, the categorical approach favors the employee,2" while the
WAYNE L. REv. 1309 (1984); Note, First Amendment Limitations on Patronage Em-
ployment Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 181 (1982).
15. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1975) (use of a categorical test when dis-
charge involves political affiliation); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (use of bal-
ancing test when discharge involves political speech).
16. A categorical test involves the articulation of a definitive standard separating
protected from unprotected activity. For discussions of the formulation of categorical
standards, see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1500-02 (1975);
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1434-35 (1962); Nim-
mer, The Right to Speak from ime to Time: First Amendment Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 942-48 (1968).
The Supreme Court first articulated a categorical approach to analyzing political affil-
iation dismissal in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion) and later
af=ed the categorical standard in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). See infra
notes 133-135 and accompanying text (discussion of categorical analysis).
17. See supra note 16 (articles comparing categorical and ad hoc balancing tests).
See generally Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983). See infra notes 113-116 and accompanying text (discussion of ad
hoc balancing).
18. Political participation, like political speech, involves overt acts by the employee
which have the capacity to disrupt the smooth operation of government. Political par-
ticipation also involves a clash of opposing political beliefs similar to affiliation cases.
19. See, eg., McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane);
Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (cases using ad hoc balancing when
employee is discharged for political participation). But see Shakman v. Democratic
Org. of Cook County, 722 F.2d 1307 (7th Cir.), cert denied sub. nom, Lindsey v. Kelly,
464 U.S. 916 (1983); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied,
455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (political participation discharge analyzed under the categorical
standards developed for political affiliation discharge in Elrod and Branti).
20. See, eg., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980). See also Note, McBee v. Jim Hogg County: On Balance a Risky Business, 45
LA. L. REv. 1095, 1099 (1985) ("[TIhe Supreme Court's assertion that 'political belief
19881
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ad hoe test benefits the state.21 Thus, the test chosen by the court es-
sentially determines the outcome of each case.22 Courts favor the ad
hoc balancing test in political activity discharge cases because of its
flexibility.
23
This Note considers what standard courts should use to determine
whether a state's discharge of a public employee for political participa-
tion violates the first amendment. Part I summarizes the historical de-
velopment of public employees' first amendment rights through the
landmark Pickering decision. Part II focuses on the emergence of the
categorical and ad hoc balancing tests after Pickering and courts' pref-
erence for ad hoc balancing. Part III explores the strengths and weak-
nesses of the ad hoc balancing test currently applied, scrutinizing the
test's pro-state bias. Part IV examines possible alternatives and refine-
ments to the ad hoe approach, engendering a more equitable balance
between the needs and concerns of both the employee and the state.24
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The first amendment is based on the premise that state suppression
of political thought, speech, and activity conflicts with the democratic
system of government.25 The last century witnessed an ebb and flow in
and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amend-
ment' results in the scales being tipped overwhelmingly in the employee's favor, unless
the State can meet the narrow Elrod-Branti exception.") (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Risky Business].
21. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686 (6th
Cir. 1985); Wachsman v. City of Dallas, 704 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1012 (1983); Wagner v. Hawkins, 634 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Ark. 1986).
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (application of balancing test favoring
interest of the state); Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347
(1976) (application of categorical standard favoring employee).
23. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (balancing test applied in in-
stance of political speech); McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en bane) (balancing test applied in instance of political participation); Jones v. Dodson,
727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (same). See also Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine
and the Burger Court, 68 CALF. L. REv. 422, 447 ("Ihe balancing test has come to
represent the routine approach of the Burger Court to first amendment issues.").
24. Another factor courts consider are the concerns and needs of the public. See
Developments, supra note 3, at 1739. When weighing the employer's and employee's
competing concerns, the court implicitly considers the public interest.
25. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (polit-
ical speech is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection"); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (political expression is a "most fundamental First
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/14
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the constitutional protection of public employees' political activity.2 6
Courts thus examine the extent to which the government regulates
political activity by using its power to hire and fire employees.2 7 Ab-
sent their status as public employees, the first amendment would pro-
tect these individuals from government sanction for political
participation.2"
More than thirty years ago, the Supreme Court upheld the tradi-
tional view that public employment is a privilege, not a right.29 There-
fore, a state employer could impose any condition on employment,
even demanding that the employee relinquish his constitutional
rights. 30  Courts rationalized this by holding that dissatisfied public
employees could work elsewhere.31
Amendment activity"); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 531 (1958) (Black, J., concur-
ring); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, concur-
ring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis,
dissenting). See also A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (contending that the general purpose of the first amendment is
democratic self-government).
26. One commentator distinguishes three eras of Supreme Court analysis regarding
public employee first amendment rights: the "private sector" era, the "individual
rights" era, and the "public service" era. Each falls within a certain time frame and
contains one or more seminal cases which categorize the Court's attitude toward public
employees during that time. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1739.
27. See Finck, Non Partisan Speech in the Police Department: The Aftermath of
Pickering, 7 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1001 (Summer 1980) [hereinafter cited as Police
Department].
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (reach of the first amendment).
29. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding New York laws
prohibiting members of certain subversive groups from teaching in public schools). The
Adler Court compared public employment to private employment, holding that public
employees should not be able to claim any extra rights or protection merely because
they worked for the government. Moreover, the Court viewed public workers as at-will
employees. Therefore, the state had the same prerogatives as a private employer to hire
or fire for almost any reason.
30. Id at 492.
31. The most famous case demonstrating the state's power to set conditions of em-
ployment under the traditional view is McAulliffe v. Mayor of New Bradford, 155
Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). Justice Holmes articulated the power of the states in his
oft-quoted holding:
[A citizen] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a [state] employee. There are few employments for hire in which
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech, as
well as idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot com-
plain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.
Ia at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
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During the 1950's, however, the Supreme Court began expanding
the rights of public employees by restricting the state's power to limit
their political activities.32 This new "doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions" meant that even in the absence of a right to public employ-
ment, the government may not force an individual to choose between
her job and her constitutional rights, unless the intended government
action would be constitutional against nonpublic employees.33
The Court's expansion of public employee first amendment protec-
tion culminated in the 1968 landmark decision of Pickering v. Board of
Education.34 In Pickering the Supreme Court prohibited the govern-
ment from compelling its employees to surrender the first amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens.35 Recognizing public
employees' unique position to observe and comment on how govern-
ment functions, the Court found the ability of public employees to
speak freely on matters of government, without fear of retaliatory dis-
charge, essential to the democratic system.36 The Court reasoned that
the threat of dismissal has a chilling effect on employees releasing perti-
32. See, e.g., Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) (rejecting the
premise that "public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned
upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct gov-
ernment action"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating a state stat-
ute which required public employees to take a loyalty oath denying past affiliation with
Communists).
33. The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). Though Frost
was not a public employment case, the doctrine's potential of encompassing all areas of
state activity is evident:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and
one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relin-
quishment of constitutional rights.
Id. at 593-94. For further discussion see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-49 (1968); Note, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
34. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering involved the dismissal of an Illinois teacher for
writing a letter to a local newspaper in which he criticized the local school board's
revenue raising proposals and the allocation of funds between the educational and ath-
letic programs of the schools. The school board dismissed Pickering because it viewed
the letter as disruptive and detrimental to the operation of the school district. Id. at
564.
35. Id. at 568. The first amendment does not apply to private employers, only to
the state and federal governments. See supra note 4 (first amendment).
36. 391 U.S. at 572.
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nent information to the public.37
The Court recognized, however, the state's special interest in regu-
lating the political activity of its employees38 because of the need to
promote efficiency and cohesiveness.3 9 Certain political activities by
employees may disrupt the work environment, impede the distribution
of government services, and hinder formulation of government pol-
icy. 4' The Pickering Court used a balancing test41 to weigh the em-
ployee's interests in communicating issues of public concern against the
state's interest in maintaining an efficient and cohesive work environ-
ment.42 The use of such an open-ended test, however, created confu-
sion and debate over: (1) reconciling the rights and concerns of the
public employee with those of the state; and (2) the weight given to the
parties' interests in varying political activity.43
37. Id at 574 (stating that "threat of dismissal from public employment is nonethe-
less a potent means of inhibiting speech").
38. 391 U.S. at 568. The Court found it essential, however, that public employees
"be able to speak out freely on such questions without fears of retaliatory dismissal."
Id at 572. The Court, therefore, implied that a public employee must be willing to
inform the public of deficiencies in government departments only when he is free from
the threat of dismissal or sanction.
39. 391 U.S. at 568.
40. Id
41. Id
42. Id. The Pickering Court refused to delineate a generally applicable standard to
judge future conflicts. Noting the varied factual circumstances in which free speech
conflicts arise, the Court found it futile to create a rigid standard. Cases involving polit-
ical speech, therefore, depend on identifying and weighing competing interests on a
case-by-case basis. 391 U.S. at 569. In the Pickering case, the employer's interests in-
cluded maintaining discipline by immediate superiors, keeping harmony among co-
workers, fostering personal loyalty and confidence, promoting efficiency in government
operations, and the ability to rebut false statements made by governmental employees
without undue difficulty. Id. at 569-74. On the employee's side, the Court examined
whether the statement involves a matter of legitimate public concern, whether the
speech was made in a public context, and whether the employee would have an in-
formed opinion on the subject. Id. at 569-73. Notably, most of the interests considered
by the Pickering Court protect the public as a whole, rather than the individual em-
ployee. See infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text (interest of the public considered
in the ad hoc balance).
43. See, e.g., McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(complexity of classifying activity leads to development of activity "spectrum"); Jones
v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the McBee spectrum and proposing
a two part activity test); Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1419-23 (8th Cir. 1983)
(applying Connick to police officers); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 314 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983) (conflicts between court decisions leads to confusion);
Shaw v. Board of Trustees, 549 F.2d 929, 932-34 (4th Cir. 1976) (difficulty in distin-
19881
Washington University Open Scholarship
390 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:383
The Court has since retreated from Pickering's expansion of public
employee rights.' In recent years, the Court's focus has changed from
protecting the employee45 to enhancing the state's rights as employer.
46
Moreover, the Court's concern lies with the state's ability to provide
essential public services in an efficient, cost-effective manner.4 7 This
new emphasis favors the claims of the state as the administrator of
such services.4 8
II. AFrER PICKERING-DIVISION AND UNCERTAINTY
Political speech concerns public issues, including criticism of the
state's methods of carrying out its duties and policies.49 Political par-
ticipation is the participation in a political campaign." Political affilia-
tion is simply the act of belonging to or identifying with a political
party or candidate.5 ' Uncertainty about which test, categorical or ad
guishing "pure speech" from other political activity); Police Department, supra note 27,
at 1026 (failure by courts to complete balancing test diminishes the test's value).
44. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1748. The Court has refined the Pickering
test considerably over the past 20 years. In Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977), the Court held that if a plaintiff demonstrates that her conduct was
constitutionally protected, and if the conduct was a substantial factor behind an em-
ployer's disciplinary action, the employer can escape liability by showing that it would
have taken the same action even in absence of the plaintiff's protected activity. Id. at
287. Also, in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) the
Court held that when a government employee personally confronts his immediate su-
pervisor, the time, place, and manner in which the employee spoke are relevant to the
Pickering ad hoe balance. Id at 415 n.4.
45. Developments, supra note 3, at 1739 (Supreme Court now places a "heavy em-
phasis on the importance of protecting the public interest in the efficient provision of
governmental services").
46. Id
47. See, eg., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (state has a prerogative to remove employee
whose conduct hinders efficient operation of office) (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 168 (1974)).
48. See, eg., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (observing that "when close working rela-
tionships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to
the employer's judgment is appropriate"); Arnett, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (government, as an employer, must be afforded wide discretion over man-
agement of personnel and internal affairs). See also supra note 21 (cases where ad hoc
balancing favors state interests).
49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
50. See Note, Politics and the Non-Civil Service Public Employee: A Categorical Ap-
proach to First Amendment Protection, 85.COLUM. L. Rv. 558, 568 n.72 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as Note].
51. See, eg., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350.
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hoc balancing, to apply following the discharge of a public employee
for engaging in one of these activities has led to extensive litigation.52
During the twenty years since Pickering, courts continue to struggle
with this problem.53
While the Supreme Court decided the applicable tests for two cate-
gories, the standard for political participation remains undecided.54
Moreover, commentators and lower courts criticize the vagueness and
inconsistencies in the standards regarding discharge for political speech
and political affiliation."
A. Discharge for Political Affiliation
A patronage is the termination of a public employee because of the
employee's political affiliation.56 In this type of dismissal, the Supreme
Court applies the categorical5 7 rather than the ad hoc balancing test.58
In Elrod v. Burns,59 the Court first announced this standard, holding
that the government may dismiss a public employee solely for political
affiliation only if the employee holds a position of confidence and policy
making within the administration.' The Court reasoned that the state
52. See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-2 at 583; Note, supra note 50, at 566.
53. See, eg., Wagner v. Hawkins, 634 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (court used
both the categorical Elrod/Branti test and the ad hoc Pickering/Connick test). Id. at
755. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (different tests applied to same
political activity).
54. A categorical test applies when discharge results from political affiliation. See
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). An ad hoc
balancing approach applies when the discharge is due to political speech. See Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
55. See, e.g., Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying a two-
pronged analysis to political activity); Wagner v. Hawkins, 634 F. Supp. 751 (W.D.
Ark. 1986) (application of either categorical or ad hoc test leads "to the same" answer).
See generally Emerson, supra note 4; Risky Business, supra note 20; Note, supra note 50;
Police Department, supra note 27.
56. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347
(1976).
57. See Branti, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
58. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
59. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion). Elrod held unconstitutional the dismis-
sal of noncivil service employees from the sheriff's office of Cook County, Illinois, solely
because they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. Id at 349.
See generally The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. R.V. 56, 186 (1976); Note,
Patronage and the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 468
(1978); Note, Will the Victor be Denied the Spoils? Constitutional Challenges to Pa-
tronage Dismissals, 4 HASTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 165 (1977).
60. 427 U.S. at 367.
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can justify such discharges only where the employee is in a position to
obstruct the implementation of administration policies.6 1
In Branti v. Finkel6 2 the Court affirmed the categorical approach to
patronage discharge. In addition, the Court narrowed the policy-mak-
ing exception to those instances where the state can prove that political
affiliation is required for the employee to effectively perform his job.63
In order to establish the constitutionality of a dismissal based on a pub-
lic employee's political affiliation, the state must show that the em-
ployee's political affiliation would interfere with her ability to perform
her job effectively. 64
61. Id at 367. The Court in Elrod focused on the established practice of political
patronage. This practice involves the hiring of government employees based on whether
the individual belongs to the party in power. A brief account of the history of political
patronage appears in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 378-80 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also D.
ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTrUTION 70-74 (1971) (tracing the
history of patronage practices in America).
The Elrod plurality stated that political patronage restricts the freedom and associa-
tion of the employee and impedes the electoral process. 427 U.S. at 355-56. The state,
however, argued that patronage provides three benefits: (1) it furthers government effi-
ciency; (2) it promotes representative government; and (3) it preserves the democratic
process. Id. at 356-58. The plurality rejected the first and third arguments and con-
cluded that the second argument is resolved by limiting patronage dismissals to policy-
making employees. Id at 364-68.
62. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Branti involved two assistant public defenders dismissed
by a Democrat because they were Republicans.
63. Id at 518. The Brantd Court explained that while a governor of a state might
demand that his assistants "who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press,
or communicate with the legislature" share his party commitments, such a demand
would be inappropriate for state university football coaches "since no one could seri-
ously claim that Republicans make better football coaches than Democrats," or for
assistant public defenders who help individual indigent clients prosecuted by the gov-
ernment. Id
64. Some courts use the Elrod/Branti rationale to create a "small county" exception
that allows for patronage discharge when the government office operates in an area of
limited population. See Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753, 756 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979). The small county exception is based on the Branti holding
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement if it affects performance of the public
office involved. Brantd, 445 U.S. at 518. The Ramey court took notice of the "intimate
relationship that undoubtedly exists between the sheriff and his deputies in a small
county like Lee County, Virginia." Ramey, 589 F.2d at 756. The court in Ramey rea-
soned that such a relationship can affect the employee's job performance. Id. While the
Ramey court did not cite the small county exception in its holding, id, at 757, the excep-
tion has been noted in other courts. See, e.g., McBee, 730 F.2d at 1026 (Tate, J., con-
curring) (concurrence based on the "small county" exception to the Elrod/Branti
doctrine as expressed in Ramey). But see Jones, 727 F.2d at 1338 n.14:
Aside from the fact that the small-size distinction in Ramey was entirely by way of
dictum, Branti, which followed Ramey, held that raw patronage discharges in a
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B. Discharge for Political Speech
Political speech is speech by a public employee regarding matters of
public concern.65 Unlike situations of dismissal for political affiliation,
the Supreme Court applies the Pickering ad hoc balancing test to polit-
ical speech discharge cases. 6" The ad hoc approach requires that the
court weigh the employee's interest in criticizing the state against the
employer's desire to maintain interoffice harmony and efficiently dis-
tribute public services. 67
A public employee who exposes the inner-workings of the state can
wreak havoc in the employer's office or administration. 68 Allowing
political speech may threaten workplace discipline69 and impede the
implementation of governmental policies and initiatives.7" Because of
these dangers, and the vast number of situations in which political
speech can arise,7 the Supreme Court refuses to articulate a categori-
cal standard, choosing instead to use the more flexible ad hoc balancing
approach.72
The most important recent development regarding political speech
discharge is the Court's 1983 decision in Connick v. Myers.73 In Con-
nine-person public defender's office were not justified under the Elrod test as
therein modified. To the extent, therefore, that the Ramey small-size distinction
may have had any vitality when decided under Elrod, we believe it has since been
completely undercut by Brant's refinement of the Elrod principle.
kId
65. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. See also infra note 78 (definition of "public
concern").
66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 (stating that "courts must reach the most
appropriate possible balance of the competing interests"). Id
68. "It is possible to conceive of some positions in public employment in which the
need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements might
furnish a permissible ground for dismissal." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3. See also
Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (Supreme Court agreeing with state's assessment that em-
ployee's exercise of speech created a "mini-insurrection" within the office).
69. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (discharge is allowed to prevent obstruction of poli-
cies presumably sanctioned by the electorate); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-73 (discipli-
nary action may be necessary to preserve the efficiency of the services performed by the
agency); Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 833 (uninhibited speech by government em-
ployees often has an inefficient, disharmonic, or even chaotic effect upon a government
office).
70. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
71. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
72. Id.
73. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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nick, the plaintiff was fired for circulating a questionnaire about office
procedure and morale to her fellow co-workers.74 The Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal, utilizing the Pickering ad hoc test.75
The Court held that before protecting a public employee's political
speech, Picketing requires the Court to find, as a threshold matter, that
the content of the speech was "of public concern."76 The majority held
74. Id. at 141. The questionnaire was in response to Assistant District Attorney
Myers' proposed transfer to another division of the criminal court. Id. at 140. The
questionnaire concerned office morale and transfer policy, the level of confidence in
supervisors, and pressure on employees to work on political campaigns; it was distrib-
uted to fifteen assistant district attorneys in the office. Id. at 141. The questionnaire
consisted of the following:
Please take the few minutes it will require to fill this out. You can freely express
your opinion WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any
superior prior to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has
been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working of A.D.A. personnel?
8. If so, how do you think effects [sic] office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through
rumor?
10. Do you have confidence in and would rely on the word of. [other office
employees].
11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of
office supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the
office structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.
461 U.S. at 155-56, Appendix A.
75. 461 U.S. at 150.
76. The Court's past decisions clearly defined certain aspects of the ad hoc balanc-
ing test, such as the factors to be weighed and the burden of proof to be met by the
parties. Until Connick, however, the Court never directly addressed the issue of what a
"matter of public concern" is for free speech purposes. Past cases held that such mat-
ters included: the allocation of school funds, Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566; the structure of
a state university system, Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95; the establishment of a faculty dress
code, Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282; and whether school policies were discriminatory,
Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413.
In Connick, the Court constructed a continuum delineating political speech by a pub-
lic employee. At one end was speech having so little value that the state could prohibit
it, and on the other was speech on matters of vital interest to the electorate. 461 U.S.
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that most of the Connick plaintiff's "speech" was not a matter of pub-
lic concern and, therefore, was unprotected." Rather, the Court
noted 71 that the "speech" was merely a public employee complaining
about a problem of purely personal interest.79 Thus, the balancing test
was inapplicable, since the state's interest in serving the public out-
weighs an employee's personal interest.80 Even applying the Pickering
balance to Connick, the slight element of public concern contained in
the speech did not outweigh the state's interests in suppression.8 1
Connick sharply curtails the political speech protection available to
public employees.8 2 The case essentially shifts the focus of the ad hoe
test from the weighing process to ascertaining whether to use the bal-
ancing test at all. If the employee speech is not of public concern, the
Court will not perform a balancing, thus permitting the state to pro-
hibit speech and retaliate against the employee.8 3 Employee speech is
further burdened by the Court's narrow definition of what constitutes
"public concern." 4 Although previous cases presented issues and ele-
147. The Court reasoned that merely characterizing speech as falling generally within
the realm of a matter of public concern is not enough to find it protected. Instead, what
is a matter of public concern "must be determined by the content, form and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147.
77. The Court held:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern,
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,... a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.
Id.
78. Id at 146.
79. Id
80. Id at 154.
81. Id at 148. The only issue the Court felt was of public concern was the pressure
on employees to work on political campaigns. Id at 149.
In dissent, Justice Brennan found three errors with the majority's reasoning: (1) the
Court should have restricted its consideration of the activity to the effect of the speech
on the office; (2) the decision "impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which
public employees may speak out without fear of retaliatory dismissal"; and (3) the
Court should have required a more substantial showing of actual disruption of the of-
fice. Id. at 156-58.
82. Connick sets a dangerous precedent because the holding exaggerates the limited
importance of the employer's judgment with regard to the constitutional right to free
speech. Most disturbing is that the Connick Court permits the public employer to jus-
tify dismissal by showing merely a reasonable belief that the expression would cause
disruption. Id at 154. The trial court, on the other hand, required a showing of actual
disruption. Id at 142.
83. Id at 154.
84. Id at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Court's definition of public concern
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ments similar to those of Connick,85 no prior court dismissed an em-
ployee speech case for failing to reach issues of public concern.86 The
Connick Court ignored the fact that past speech cases concerned state
policy decisions that personally affected the employee.8 7 Thus, the
Connick public concern test 88 causes confusion over what employee
speech courts may actually consider a matter of public concern.89
Most importantly, Connick tips the Pickering scales in the govern-
ment's favor.9" By emphasizing the public's right to efficient service,
and narrowing an employee's right to publicize matters of public con-
cern, the Court gives the state great discretion to judge the adverse
effect of the employee's speech on its ability to function.91 Justice
Brennan's dissent noted that Connick will result in public employees
hesitating to publicly criticize their supervisors.92
"impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which public employees may speak out
without fear of retaliatory dismissal").
85. See supra note 76 (list of pre-Connick cases dealing with matters of "public
concern").
86. Compare supra note 76 (Connick questionnaire) with supra note 76 (list of pre-
Connick cases dealing with matters of "public concern").
87. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582 (school funds allocation affects public employee
through impact on salary); Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95 (the elevation of junior college to
four-year college would affect public employee as a professor at the institution); Mount
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282 (school board's dress code for employees included complaining
public employee); Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413 (allegedly discriminatory policies of the
school district affected public employee as a teacher in that district). Compare Connick,
461 U.S. at 143 (district attorney office transfer policy and internal operating proce-
dures affecting public employee not a matter of "public concern").
88. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
89. See Comment, Connick v. Myers, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 471, 441 (1985). In a
sharp departure from past decisions, the Connick majority deferred to the state's judg-
ment and adopted the position that the speech's actual disruption of the state's opera-
tions is not required to justify the discharge of a public employee. Id.
90. The Court noted:
When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment dispute
concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight
must be given to the supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the author-
ity of the employer to run the office.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
91. See Note, Public Employee's Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Meyers Upsets the
Delicate Pickering Balance, XIII REv. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 173 (1984) (explaining
how the Connick decision departs from the Supreme Court's traditional position that
only certain narrowly defined categories of speech are outside the protection of the first
amendment) [hereinafter cited as Free Speech Rights].
92. Connick, 461 U.S. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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C. Discharge for Political Participation
Political participation is the participation of a public employee in a
political campaign or election.93 The Supreme Court has not decided
whether the categorical or ad hoc balancing test applies in this situa-
tion. Therefore, various lower courts have applied different standards
in political participation discharge cases.94 Two federal courts of ap-
peal, however, used the Pickering ad hoc balancing test,95 comparing
political participation to political speech cases.96
In McBee v. Jim Hogg County,97 the sheriff's department fired depu-
ties for actively campaigning for the election of the sheriff's oppo-
nent.98 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Connick
collapsed the differing analytical approaches set forth in Pickering99
and Elrod/Branti oo into a single ad hoc balancing inquiry.10 1 The
93. See, e.g., McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
94. See, eg., id.; Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984) (cases using ad hoc
balancing when employee is discharged for political participation). But see Shakman v.
Democratic Org. of Cook County, 722 F.2d 1307 (7th Cir.), cert denied sub. nom,
Lindsey v. Kelly, 464 U.S. 916 (1983); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (political participation discharge analyzed
under the categorical standards developed for political affiliation in Elrod/Brantl). No-
tably, the Seventh Circuit cases predated Connick. Thus, the Seventh Circuit may con-
ceivably apply a different test in light of Connick.
95. McBee, 730 F.2d 1009; Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984).
96. These courts find political participation similar to political speech because both
involve overt action by the employee, while political affiliation is a passive act. See, e.g.,
McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014.
97. 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
98. The plaintiffs in McBee openly supported the previous sheriff during the election
by attending political rallies, placing bumper stickers on their cars, and publicly endors-
ing the candidate. Id. at 1018.
99. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
101. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014. The court stated:
Such cases might reasonably be expected to locate themselves on a spectrum; we
conclude that they do.
Elrod and Brand, we think, lie at the extreme of the employee's side, where little,
if any weighing is called for. There employees who were, it appears, both loyal and
effective were discharged on the sole ground of their private and-for employment
purposes-al but abstract political views. They did not campaign, they did not
even speak: they merely thought. No countervailing considerations appear; they
suffered discharge for pure political beliefs, a circumstance that explains the com-
parative absence of "weighing" terminology in these opinions.
lad (footnotes omitted).
In dissent, Judge Rubin attacked the majority's rule of categorical protection of ab-
stract belief only. Id at 1025. Furthermore, he pointed out that Connick, on which the
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Fifth Circuit found political affiliation and political speech to be on
opposite ends of the political activity "spectrum," 1°2 with political par-
ticipation somewhere in-between.10 3 Where the court places political
participation on the spectrum determines the weight of various factors
in the balancing process."
In Jones v. Dodson"10 the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected Mc-
Bee's collapse of the Pickering and Elrod/Branti distinctions." 6 In-
stead, the Jones court imposed a rigid, two-step analysis. First, the
court must determine whether the discharge resulted from party affilia-
tion or overt speech activity.1"7 In political affiliation cases, the Court
should apply the Elrod/Branti categorical analysis.108 If the discharge
results from any overt form of political speech or political participa-
tion, the Pickering/Connick ad hoe balancing approach applies.1 09
Although Jones rejects the McBee spectrum, the result is identical.
Both circuits analyze discharge for political participation using the ad
hoe balancing test."' Applying the Pickering balancing test to polit-
ical participation, discharge results in the same problems that arise in
political speech cases.1 ' Jones is most important for rejecting the Mc-
Bee spectrum and attempting to combine the categorical and ad hoc
balancing tests into a single weighing process. 1 2 Equally significant is
majority relies in creating the spectrum, "does not take one whit from Elrod or BrantiL."
Id. at 1021.
102. See id. at 1014.
103. Id
104. Id. at 1016-17. The majority criticized the "categorical approaches of the dis-
trict court and the panel," and held that Connick directed them to "tailor the analysis to
the particular facts of each case." Id at 1016. On remand, the trial court, using the
Connick test described by the appellate court, still found in favor of the plaintiffs. Mc-
Bee v. Jim Hogg County, Civil Action No. L-81-3 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
105. 727 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1984). Jones involved the discharge of a deputy for
meeting with a political opponent of the incumbent sheriff of a rural county. Id at
1330-35.
106. Id at 1334-35 n.6.
107. Id at 1336.
108. Id
109. Id
110. McBee, 730 F.2d 1009; Jones, 727 F.2d 1329. See Risky Business, supra note
20, at 1100.
111. See infra notes 119-129 and accompanying text (weaknesses of the ad hoc
balance).
112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (Jones rejection of the McBee spec-
trum analysis).
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the court's recognition that a categorical analysis is relevant to political
activity discharge actions. The problem explored in the next section is
how to correct the imbalances in the Pickering/Connick test and how
to extend the categorical standard to encompass more political activity
cases.
III. AD Hoc BALANCING-STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
In its purest form, the ad hoc balancing test affords courts wide dis-
cretion to identify and to weigh competing interests on a case-by-case
basis and to generate fact-specific results.113 Because of the test's flexi-
bility, courts try to apply ad hoc balancing to first amendment is-
sues. I When a court identifies the controlling factors, it balances the
interests and decides which party has a more compelling argument. 1 '
Cases which list the significance and weight attached to each element
guide future courts confronted with similar situations. 1
6
The ad hoc balancing analysis works well in political speech and
participation discharges because these cases are fact-specific. " 7 Since
this method is sensitive to factual nuances, it often provides more accu-
rate results and greater protection than a rigid categorical standard."'
Yet the flexibility of ad hoc balancing creates disadvantages. Be-
cause the process allows courts to choose and weigh" 9 various factors,
113. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (balancing used
to invalidate restraint on publication of news regarding trial); Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. Rnv. 265, 300-02 (1981)
(describing the amount of discretion afforded judges by different forms of first amend-
ment analysis); Henkin, Infallibility Under the Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1048 (1978) (balancing requires "judges to find, define, articu-
late, and justify... out of very few straws"). See also supra note 16 (list of sources
describing ad hoc balancing).
114. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1757-58 (suggesting that ad hoc balancing
may be the only method by which to analyze free speech problems).
115. See supra note 16 (list of sources describing ad hoc balancing method); Emer-
son, supra note 4, at 912-14 (describing ad hoc balancing).
116. See McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d at 1016 n.20 (holding that the bal-
ancing test in Pickering and its progeny fails to prescribe a fixed set of factors and
provides only guidance to a court as to which factors might be important).
117. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (Court refused to delineate categori-
cal standard due to impossibility of creating such a standard in the speech context).
118. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at 945 ("[S]peech which might be protected if the
particular interests involved in a particular case were subject to the precision of the ad
hoc scalpel might lose protection by the cutting of the blunter definitional [categorical]
knife.").
119. See, e.g., supra notes 101 and 116 and accompanying text. See also Connick,
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the results12 ° are inconsistent. 12 1 Thus, appellate review is often
merely a re-evaluation of the competing interests using a different set of
personal preferences, 122 resulting in inconsistent review. 12
3
Another problem with ad hoc balancing is that courts defer to states'
interests, 124 creating an inherent bias toward the state in the weighing
process. 125
Most importantly, the ad hoc approach leaves uncertain what em-
ployee speech or participation is actually permissible. 126 The absence
* of a reliable standard may prevent a public employee from exercising
her first amendment rights to the greatest extent possible. 127 The lack
of clear standards also affects the state's judgment about when it may
discharge a public employee and avoid liability. 121
These factors demonstrate the need for reform in applying the ad
hoc balancing test. Specifically, the Supreme Court should enumerate
the weight courts should place on certain factors and policy considera-
tions. Since courts currently analyze political speech and participation
461 U.S. at 147-48 (legal weight of speech "must be determined by the content, form,
and context of the given statement, as revealed by the whole record") (footnotes omit-
ted); id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's subjective conclusion that
the expression was not a matter of public concern).
120. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 912-14 (balancing as a legal doctrine for afford-
ing judicial protection to a system of free expression is not tenable).
121. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 912 (ad hoc balancing is so broad and undefined
that it can hardly be described as a rule).
122. See Henkin, supra note 113, at 1048.
123. Id.
124. See, eg., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (noting that "when close working rela-
tionships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to
the employer's judgment is appropriate"); Developments, supra note 3, at 1767 (noting
that "[b]y uncritically accepting proffered rationales for restrictions on public employee
speech and by failing to examine employee's legitimate interests in such expression,
courts have placed a heavy thumb on the employer's side of the Pickering balance").
125. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 913 (finding that, to date, the test gives almost
conclusive weight to the state's judgment).
126. "[W]hen one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position,
one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.'" Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). See also Schauer, supra note
113, at 299.
127. Schauer, supra note 113, at 299.
128. See, eg., DeLaCruz v. Pruitt, 590 F. Supp. 1296, 1307-08 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(upholding personal liability of supervisor for patronage discharge); Emerson, supra
note 4, at 913 (ad hoc test affords government officials inadequate notice of the pro-
tected rights).
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discharge cases under the ad hoc standard, 29 replacing or improving
the test will greatly affect first amendment protection of public em-
ployee political activities. The next section explores possible improve-
ments, especially in the area of employer/state bias, either by refining
or replacing the ad hoc method.
IV. ALTERNATIVES AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE AD Hoc
BALANCING TEST
A. Limiting the Application of the Ad Hoc Approach: The
Categorical Method
The most direct way to prevent the problems created by the ad hoe
balancing test is to limit its application to certain activities. Rather
than using the ad hoc test in political speech and participation cases
130
and the categorical test for political affiliation, 13' courts should apply
the categorical analysis to all three types of political activities. 132
Courts using the categorical approach articulate definitive standards
to separate protected from unprotected activity. 133 Once a court an-
nounces a standard for a specific activity, courts decide future cases by
applying the applicable rule to the enumerated facts. 34 Thus, when a
court classifies a case, it need only apply a rule of law to the facts-
without utilizing a balancing test. 135
The categorical approach provides beneficial results. First, the anal-
ysis shields the parties from judicial caprice arising from subjective
evaluations inherent in the ad hoc balancing test. 36 Second, the cate-
129. See supra notes 42 and 94 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
132. But see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (the infinite varieties of political speech
make a categorical standard virtually impossible).
133. See supra note 16 (sources discussing distinctions between categorical analysis
and ad hoc balancing). See also Schauer, supra note 113, at 296-305 (comparing ad hoc
balancing and categorical analysis).
134. See id. at 296-305 (formulation and use of categorical standards). In particu-
lar, categorical rules relieve courts of the responsibility of assigning first amendment
value to any particular form of expression.
135. Ad hoc balancing "sets the court to doing... not what 'is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department'-to say what the law is-but what would
seem emphatically to be the province or competence of the political branches-the
weighing of competing societal interests and values." Henkin, supra note 113, at 1048
(footnote omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
136. See Nimmer, supra note 16, at 945.
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gorical analysis would simplify appellate review by supplying tangible
rules of law.137 Finally, a clear standard would provide all parties with
a clearer understanding of what conduct is protected.138
Categorical analysis, however, is imperfect. It is, for example, diffi-
cult to create a standard for measuring all future activity.' 39 In addi-
tion, the test's rigidity may occasionally allow unjust results by
categorizing all actions as either protected or unprotected." This
standard is less fact-sensitive than ad hoc balancing and fails to ac-
count for hidden factors. 41 Still, the benefits derived from the cer-
tainty and predictability of the categorical test outweigh occasionally
harsh results. The infrequent unjust outcome is a small price to pay for
the clear standards provided by a categorical approach. 42
Although in the abstract, categorical analysis is superior to ad hoc
balancing, in reality, the categorical test is inapplicable to all public
employee political activities.143 Because of this flaw, courts apply cate-
gorical analysis only to political affiliation discharges. 1" A closer ex-
amination indicates that courts should also review political
participation discharges under the categorical standard instead of the
unpredictable ad hoc approach.'45 Since "participation" is more akin
to political affiliation than to political speech,' 46 the categorical test
137. See Schauer, supra note 113, at 294.
138. See id at 299 (discussing chilling effect of flexible legal standards); Emerson,
supra note 4, at 913 (suggesting that lack of advance notice under ad hoc approach will
prompt parties to move cautiously in their expressions and reactions).
139. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (difficulty of creating categorical standard for
speech problems). See also Schauer, supra note 113, at 267-69 (problems associated
with categorization of first amendment rights). Professor Schauer also notes, however,
that categories and balancing, in the first amendment context, are not mutually exclu-
sive. d at 266.
140. See Note, supra note 50, at 570.
141. Ia
142. See Tribe, supra note 14, § 12-2, at 583-84. Professor Tribe comments that
although ad hoc balancing might result in "some 'famous victories' for the cause of free
expression," it leaves "no one very sure that any particular expressive act will find a
constitutional shield." Id (footnote omitted).
143. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (the infinite varieties of political speech make it
futile to delineate a definite standard).
144. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (application of categorical analysis
limited to political participation discharge).
145. See generally Note, supra note 50, at 559.
146. Political participation is closer to political affiliation than to political speech
because both rely on some overt action of identifying with or working for a certain
political candidate, party, or cause. The friction between the supervisor and the em-
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should apply to political participation cases. Thus, the same rationale
for using the categorical analysis in political affiliation cases is relevant
to political participation discharges.
Courts premise the use of the categorical standard in political affilia-
tion cases on the idea that nonpolicy-making, nonconfidential employ-
ees are unable to obstruct the state's ability to (,perate efficiently. 47 A
similar rationale applies to employee participation in a political cam-
paign or election. Nonpolicy-making, nonconfidential employees can-
not seriously disrupt or obstruct the functions of government simply
through political participation. 4 ' If the employee's behavior during
the participation constitutes a dereliction of duty or insubordination,
dismissal may be justified on other grounds. 149 The state must demon-
strate that personal loyalty is necessary for "effective performance" of
the employee's duties to support a discharge for political
participation.' 50
While categorical analysis can be easily applied to political participa-
tion discharge, this test does not readily adapt to political speech
cases. " Additionally, whether the Supreme Court will apply the cate-
ployee results from differing political preferences. Political speech, on the other hand,
involves an employee's critical statements regarding how the office is being run or the
efficacy of the supervisor. The friction between employee and supervisor goes to the
heart of the operation and competency of the government. See Note, supra note 50, at
559.
147. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (holdings in Brand and Elrod).
148. See Note, supra note 50, at 574-75. The argument rests on the assumption that
the possible inefficiency resulting from conflicts between the employee and employer
over the former's political participation presents no additional complications for imple-
menting government policies than the mere partisan affiliation in Elrod and Branti. Id.
at 574. But see Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d at 1334-35 n.6. The Jones court explicitly
refused to analyze political participation under a categorical method, fearing that em-
ployees would cloak insubordination under a protective mantle provided to all professed
"political" expressions.
149. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 365-66 (stating that employees may always be dismissed
for "good cause"); Mt Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (if state can show the employee would
be dismissed regardless of his political activity, the discharge stands); Nathanson v.
United States, 702 F.2d 162 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983) (discharge
allowed when plaintiff refused to review applications); Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d
1169 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub, nom, Goldwasser v. Seamans, 397 U.S. 922 (1970)
(army instructor dismissed for refusing to instruct class on assigned materials).
150. Cf Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Gonzalez v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1983) (remanding case to district court to rule on whether the relationship between the
employee and supervisor "fell into that narrow band of fragile relationships requiring
job security loyalty at the expense of unfettered speech"). Id, at 150.
151. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
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gorical analysis to political participation discharges is uncertain.152
Assuming the permanence of the ad hoe balancing test, courts must
correct the test's current administrative imbalances.
B. Redefining the Factors of the Ad Hoc Balance
The assertion that "courts have placed a heavy thumb on the em-
ployer's side of the Pickering balance"15 3 represents courts' current
bias toward factors supporting the state's position. 154 Case law reveals
that while courts thoroughly and exhaustively discuss state's interests,
the employees' concerns receive little consideration. 155 To achieve an
equitable result, however, the court must fully and equally weigh all of
the interests of each party. Ignoring interests of one side while grant-
ing blind deference to the other destroys the purpose of the balancing
method. 156
1. The State as Employer
Legitimate governmental interests are affected when an employee en-
gages in political activity. 57 The courts' general deference to these in-
terests,158 unfortunately, has led to an inherent bias in favor of the state
152. Given the Court's restrictive holding in Connick and the seventh and fourth
circuits' holdings in McBee and Jones, ad hoc balancing for most political activity seems
firmly entrenched.
153. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1767.
154. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (wide degree of deference to the state is
often required). See also Boals, 775 F.2d 686; Wachsman, 704 F.2d 160; Wagner, 634 F.
Supp. 751 (cases where ad hoc balancing favored state interests).
155. See, eg., Picketing, 391 U.S. at 569-73 (in applying ad hoc test, Court limits
discussion to the employer's negligible stake and the public's interest in having the in-
formation); McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d at 1016-17; Hughes v. Whitmer, 714
F.2d 1407, 1419-23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom, Hughes v. Hoffman, 465 U.S. 1023
(1984). See also Developments, supra note 3, at 1757 (courts have neglected the em-
ployee's interest in expression); Police Department, supra note 27, at 1026 (courts fail to
mention the substantial interests of the employees).
156. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interest of the [em-
ployee] in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.
Id.
157. These include, for example, the efficient delivery of government services, Con-
nick, 461 U.S. at 150; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-73; the implementation of the policies
of the elected administration, Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367; and the maintenance of interoffice
harmony, Meehany, 392 F.2d at 833.
158. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (deference to state is appropriate); Emer-
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under the ad hoc balance.' 59 Greater judicial scrutiny of the state's
asserted interests is needed to eliminate this bias and to ensure that
courts identify a genuine governmental interest for each discharge. 60
Courts should only defer to the state when it can convincingly show
that the particular workplace demands overriding cooperation and co-
hesion.16 1 Courts should carefully analyze the employer-employee re-
lationship to determine if it requires such a degree of intimacy and
agreement that the employee must surrender some first amendment
protections to retain employment.
162
2. The Public
The public has two areas of concern regarding a state employee's
political activity:' 63 maintaining both the open discussion of govern-
ment affairs and the inner-workings of our governmental institu-
tions; 6' and the efficient delivery of government services. 165 Although
these concerns are not mutually exclusive, courts currently emphasize
the latter. 166 This preference is misplaced. The free exchange of ideas
as to how government should function is vital to the democratic sys-
tem.' 67 Public employees are situated to supply insightful opinions
son, supra note 4, at 913 ("As applied to date, the [ad hoc balancing] test gives almost
conclusive weight to the [state's] judgment [in the discharge].").
159. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1767 ("[B]y uncritically accepting proffered
rationales for restrictions on public... employee's legitimate interests in such expres-
sion, courts have placed a heavy thumb on the employer's side of the Pickering
balance.").
160. Id. (noting that courts have become lazy in scrutinizing the claims of the state
employer and should become more involved) (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 1768.
162. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3.
163. In Pickering, the Court did not expressly address any general public interest.
The factors the Court used to evaluate the employee's interest, however, included
whether the speech was a matter of public concern and whether it was made in a public
context. 391 U.S. at 569-73. Because the public has an implicit interest in the em-
ployee's speech, this concern figures in the ad hoc balance. See also Arnett, 416 U.S. at
168 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (stating that "the Government's interest, and hence
the public's interest, is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline").
164. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1758 (Constitution places paramount value
on robust discussion and criticism of government) (footnote omitted).
165. Id at 1769 (grievances of public employees concern the public when they
threaten the efficiency or competence of public employees to deliver government
services).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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about the inner-workings of government.16 8
Although Connick protected only a public employee's expression on
matters of public concern under the first amendment, 169 courts should
remain flexible in applying Connick.1' When in doubt, courts should
tip the balance in favor of the free flow of information through political
expression."' Courts utilizing the ad hoc balancing test should con-
sider the free flow of information as the dominant public interest. 172
The importance of the efficient delivery of services pales in comparison
to the deleterious effects of suppressing political activity that informs
the public about the government.1 7 1 Only when the state can show
that its delivery of services will be substantially impaired should effi-
ciency outweigh information.
3. The Employee
Since Pickering, courts discount the public employee's side of the ad
hoc balance.174 If the goal is a fair and true assessment of the effect of
the employee's political activity, then courts must include the em-
168. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72 (to allow the government to discharge its
employees in retaliation for their criticism of workplace affairs would remove from pub-
lic discussion the views and insights of a class of individuals especially knowledgeable
about government).
169. See supra note 76 (discussion of what is public concern).
170. As an example of the harshness of the current Connick standard, less than a
month after the Connick decision, the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the firing
of a nonstriking air traffic controller who told a group of striking controllers to "stay
together" after they went out. MSPB Docket N. NY075281F1457, slip op. (May 19,
1983) at 2. The Board held that the Connick principles mandated the employee's dis-
missal because the speech was only tangentially related to a matter of public concern.
1d at 12.
171. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969) (right to receive information and ideas, regardless of social worth, is funda-
mental to a free society).
172. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the first
amendment "protects the dissemination of such information so that the people, not the
courts, may evaluate its usefulness").
173. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("[The Constitution recog-
nizes higher values than speed and efficiency. . . . [Tihe Bill of Rights . . . [was]
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency."); Free Speech Rights, supra note 91, at 184 ("[IThe proper objec-
tive should be to determine whether the quality of public services offered by the public
entity actually suffered as a result of the employee's speech.").
174. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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ployee's valid interests in the balance.175 Such interests include the
employee's right to hold views different from the employer, 176 the em-
ployee's interest in speaking from a professional perspective on work-
place affairs without fear of reprisal by the state, 177 the employee's
right to fair working conditions, 178 and the employee's right to partici-
pate in the political process. 179
In addition to substantively considering these interests when apply-
ing the ad hoc test, courts should also adopt a more liberal approach
toward the individual employee. Courts should focus on "individual
dignity and choice" rather than viewing public employee political
speech and participation as a disruption requiring state restriction.180
Emphasizing individual choice reflects the true meaning and intent of
the first amendment. 8
The ad hoc balancing test can only benefit from the method of re-
view suggested above. Not only must the interests in public employee
political activity situations be clarified, but courts must also consist-
ently and critically review all the interests involved in the balance.
182
175. See supra notes 67, 113-118 (application of ad hoc balance test).
176. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,715 (1977) (stating that the first amend-
ment is meant to protect the right "to hold a point of view different from the majority").
177. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
178. Connick, 461 U.S. at 165.
179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (any attempt by gov-
ernment to silence those who engage in political participation can be justified only by a
compelling state interest).
180. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The Court stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as di-
verse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of indi-
vidual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id.
181. See Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1435-36 (8th Cir. 1983), cerL denied
sub. noma, Hughes v. Hoffman, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that majority elevated unexamined efficiency concern about the employee's interest
in speech). See also supra note 25 and accompanying text (free political speech is at the
heart of first amendment protection).
182. See generally supra notes 93, 124 and accompanying text; Police Department,
supra note 27.
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C. The Compelling State Interest Test
The categorical and ad hoc approaches are currently the only meth-
ods of analysis courts use to examine public employee political activity
discharge cases. Yet, other analyses are available. A "compelling state
interest" test is a plausible alternative. 18
3
Under a compelling state interest test, the state would have the bur-
den of proving its paramount interest in limiting the employee's polit-
ical activity. 84 The public employer must also show that the means
used to limit that activity are narrowly drawn so as to avoid unnecessa-
rily infringing on constitutional rights.18 The test basically combines
the categorical and ad hoc methods. The first step calls for a categori-
cal standard whereby the state must define the areas in which its inter-
est is paramount. The second step requires a balancing approach. At
this stage, the court would weigh all relevant facts to determine
whether the state's actions were the least restrictive means available.
Such a test would provide a single, uniform method applicable to all
three types of political activity.186
Clearly, a test that applies to all three types of political activity
would eliminate the confusion and conceptual difficulties that arise
under the present inconsistent approaches.18 7 Further, developing a
categorical standard will enable both the employee and the state to
know what types of activity and retaliation are permitted. 18
CONCLUSION
The current ad hoc balancing test requires reform. Courts using this
183. See Free Speech Rights, supra note 91, at 196 (advocating that ad hoc balancing
be replaced with a compelling state interest test). This test is analogous to that set forth
in Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980), relating to state regulation of commercial speech. The author also notes that a
compelling state interest test is similar, if not the same test the Court uses in cases of
dismissal of political patronage. Id. at 196 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Branti v. Fin-
kel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-17 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
184. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
185. Id. at 363 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25).
186. For example, in Connick the state would have to show that discharging Myers
was the only remedy and that no less drastic alternatives to dismissal were available.
Thus, had the Court applied a compelling state interest test, the outcome of Connick
would probably be different.
187. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
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test fail to adequately consider all of the interests of each affected party.
Further, the courts' current emphasis on economic efficiency over free
expression is misplaced. By analyzing all interests in greater detail,
courts using the ad hoc method can achieve a more equitable result.
Even with equal consideration of all the interests, ad hoc balancing
creates problems for courts, including difficulty in appellate review and
lack of guidance as to the importance and weight attached to each fac-
tor. Additionally, ad hoc balancing results in a lack of notice to the
parties as to what activities are protected. A categorical standard elim-
inates these problems by establishing a definite standard against which
courts measure political activity. A categorical test, however, may
have harsh results because it lacks flexibility. Finally, the infinite vari-
eties of political speech make creating a rigid categorical standard
impossible.
With these problems in mind, courts should: (1) analyze political
participation discharge under a categorical test similar to the one used
for political affiliation cases; and (2) give consistent and diligent consid-
eration to all interests when applying the ad hoc balancing test in polit-
ical speech cases. A third, but unlikely, alternative would be to discard
the Pickering and Elrod/Branti tests and adopt a compelling state in-
terests test for all three types of activity. The first two changes would
place most public employee political participation cases under the
more predictable categorical standard and would eliminate the current
bias in favor of the state. The third change would combine the best
attributes of the categorical and ad hoc methods, while providing a
single test for political activity cases. Any of these changes give free
speech and free political expression adequate first amendment protec-
tion, while allowing for the efficient and representative operation of the
state. Deference to free political discussion and to the individual's
right to participate in the political process will affirm the democratic
principles inherent in the first amendment.
Sterling L. Miller*
* J.D. 1988, Washington University.
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